UNIVERSAL VERSUS NATIONAL STATE DIALECTIC: A PHILOSOPHICAL CONTRAST BETWEEN AL-FARABI AND HEGEL

DR. MOHAMED OSMAN ELKHOSHT

Professor of Modern and Contemporary Philosophy,

Faculty of Arts, Cairo University

PREFACE:

The ideas of "universal" and "national" states have occupied a prominent place in political philosophy as they have a potential to solve many of the problems that are above the capabilities of either the civil or local government states. They can realize the dream of the comprehensive unity of humanity or a nation facing fragmentation and internal feuds. If the national state appears as a historical necessity to assert sovereignty and public will of a nation confronting colonialism and hegemony, the universal state appears, on the other hand as a human hope that has engaged the thought of many philosophers. This is based on the unity of the human race and the desire to set up a just government for all humanity. The dream of a universal state took deviant turns at certain times in history to serve the interests of a national sovereignty as a means to swallow up other nations, or to assert chauvinistic self-determination of one nation against others.

The idea of a universal state is not purely Western. It has its origin in the history of Islamic philosophy as well,

especially with Al-Farabi in the 10th century (4th Hegira Century). Although his idea of the utopian world is obviously moralistic, it fell in the trap of personalizing the state. However, the idea of establishing a universal state remains a great idea that fascinates humanist philosophers. In contrast to the universal state, the national state had an almost deified status for some philosophers such as Hegel. This takes dimensions that can threaten the unity of the human race, consecrate wars and endanger international peace. Political analysts have studied at length the idea of the universal state versus the national state, but a need still arises to conduct a philosophical contrastive study of the two ideas. Ideas are sometimes generated by philosophers only to be picked up by politicians, or they may be initiated by politicians for philosophers to formulate into well-wrought doctrines that give them legitimacy.

Therefore, resorting to philosophy becomes a necessity for revealing the roots in order to discern the intellectual and metaphysical discrepancies created by the philosophers who provided the theoretical bases for the two ideas. The two examples the study will deal with are Al-Farabi and Hegel as models from two different cultures. They are chosen for their special importance in the development of these two ideas and for their philosophies which created the discrepancies that sum up most of the problems faced by political philosophy in the context of the ideas of the universal versus the national states. Among the most important of the discrepancies is the fact that the metaphysical basis of the universal state is almost the same metaphysical basis of the idea of the national state!

This becomes especially obvious in both Al-Farabi and Hegel who based their ideas on metaphysical grounds. Legitimacy for them has metaphysical roots; it is not drawn from the people, the nation or the subjects of a state. Al-Farabi made

heavens, the divine realm, analogous to the utopia. The ruler is analogous to God. Hegel, as well, considered the king analogous to the Absolute Spirit, *Geist*, and the state as a stage of the development of the Spirit! Naturally, there are differences between the metaphysics of the two philosophers, but the similarity lies in their relating the political to the metaphysical, namely the primary principle of existence. This is God for Al-Farabi and the Absolute Spirit for Hegel.

Naturally again, there are differences between Al-Farabi's concept of God and Hegel's idea of the Absolute Spirit (or the Absolute Mind). The similarity only lies in that both thinkers make these two concepts the primary metaphysical basis of existence and hence they take political legitimacy away from the people, the society of the public will. The comparison of Al-Farabi and Hegel does not negate other differences between them. Neither

does it deny that these differences do not only arise from the variance of opinions concerning universal versus national states, but they also arise from the diversity of the historical and cultural backgrounds of the two thinkers. There is, moreover, a real paradox in the fact that despite the variance of backgrounds and the differences between the universal and national sates, some similarities impose themselves. They are as such similarities and not identical points. They have relative congruency-parts of their ideas converge then diverge again. Sometimes, similar ideas meet; then one of them outsteps the other. This may happen because of the difference of methodology, ideology or cultural and historical backgrounds.

Despite all the difference between Al-Farabi and Hegel, the basic paradoxical similarity/ dissimilarity lies in the fact that the metaphysical basis of the universal state idea is almost the same like that of the

national state! How can two different political ideas be based on the same metaphysical foundation? How can the "national state" be in opposition to the "universal state" for Hegel on philosophical metaphysical basis while the "state-nation" can be a unit of the universal units of Al-Farabi's utopia on a philosophical metaphysical basis as well? How did the utopian universal state take shape while Al-Farabi believed in a personalized state and the merging of rule and the ruler? How is Hegel's personalized state reconciled with institutions-based state? Why did the national state idea strengthen the colonial movement while it also served as a factor of independence from colonialism? Why has the idea of universal state failed to materialize until now while the idea of the national state thrived? Finally, is there a way out of the historical dialectic through a third thesis?

A real paradox like this requires philosophical analysis which is the methodological justification for this paper. It attempts to solve these problems through an analytic, critical comparison between two thinkers from two different cultural contexts. This is meant to be a contribution to the dialogue of civilizations and an attempt to reveal the roots of the structure of despotic thinking which might be the same in their hidden depths despite the apparent surface disparities. In spite of the abundance of studies dealing with Al-Farabi and Hegel, there is no study, as far as I know, that assumes almost shared metaphysical grounds for both the universal and the national states! No such studies approached the resultant paradoxes of the underlying political philosophies or raised questions concerning the similarities / dissimilarities of the historical materialization of these ideas. No previous study, to my knowledge, has compared Al-Farabi and Hegel in the context undertaken by this paper, especially as this paper does not deal

with the concept of influence- a domain of study not considered here by any means. The study seeks to reveal the roots of despotism which drive some thinkers to create discrepancies and sometimes even contradictions which they could have avoided if they followed their logical rationality to the end, liberating themselves from the dominating values and ruling political systems of their times.

INTRODUCTION: UNIVERSALISM AND NATIONALISM IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS

The universal tendency as a call for equality and the value unity of humanity is a rational self-justified principle. Various religions and philosophies have called for this at least on the theoretical level[i]. The call for universalism did not appear in Greek philosophy until the age of Aristotle as previously a fanatic racial tendency had been prevalent. In the Hellenistic age (323 BC until the fall of Alexandria into Roman hands in 30 BC),[ii] the Stoics called for universal citizenship seeing "the entire cosmos, Cosmic nature or the Universe, as a rationally organized unity". The stoic belief in the "cosmos-state or state-cosmos" is the political aspect of their philosophical theory of the universe. They see "the entire cosmos as of one substance and one nature"[iii]. Zeno says,

All the inhabitants of this world of ours should not live differentiated by their respective rules of justice into separate cities and communities, but that we should consider all men to be of one community and one polity, and that we should have a common life and an order common to us all, even as a herd that feeds together and shares the pasturage of a common field.[iv]

Parallel to this stoic philosophical outlook was the political view that Alexander the Great set out to apply in the real world.

In Islamic philosophy, the idea of universalism appeared in the writings of Ikhwān aṣ-Ṣafā (Brethren of Serenity) in a cultural religious manner as they advocated the unity of religions, philosophies and cultures. However, on the political level, they maintained the limiting idea of the leadership of the infallible Imam within a Gnostic framework concocted by Ismaili Shiites. The Islamic political totalitarian tendency, says French orientalist Henri Laoust, had its beginning in Al-Farabi as well as Al-Juwayni, Al-Ghazali and Fakhr ed-Deen Al-Razi. The totalitarian tendency has always asserted that the utopian city has to engulf the entire humanity[v]. However, the image of the universal government created by the Islamic school gave prominence to the characteristics of the ruler at the expense of the governmental institutions, which led to what can be called "personalizing the system".

With the advent of the modern age, a European school emerged with an image of an international government which, it may be said, could not go beyond a group of European states. This is exemplified in the ideas set forth by the French jurist Pierre Dubois to formulate a federation of Western European states with the purpose of establishing peace among them and directing the force of that union to restore the holy lands in the Orient, and by French statesman Sully who, the trusted minister of King Henry IV, called for federation of the Christian European states in the 17th century. The German philosopher Leibnitz called in 1670 for a unified Europe to fight off the Ottomans. In 1676, he again called for an international union to be presided over by the emperor, as a temporal ruler, and the Pope as a spiritual ruler. In addition, 17th Century Abbé de Saint Pierre wrote *Projet pour rendre la Paix perpétuelle en Europe* (Project for Bringing about Perpetual Peace in

Europe) confining the union to Christians to the exclusion of the Turks and all others.

Another European school had wider human horizons, universal philosophical vision and world political ideology. Its best representative may be Geert Geerts (1466-1536), known as Erasmus, who was the leading Renaissance scholar of northern Europe. He wrote the *Praise of Folly*, among other works, ignoring the wrath of the rulers and church clergy to satirize the follies of humans in his time[vi]. Erasmus was a model of tolerance and an advocate of humanism and universalism as a means to overcome the fanatic sectarian strife in Europe. Therefore, his political thought was formed by his vision of a universal peace and of unanimity and agreement as the base of the state[vii].

This tendency is also found in Sir Thomas More's famous fantastic *Utopia*, and Immanuel Kant who wrote "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" where he called for a universal association of the democratic states with republican constitutions which live under the principle of sovereignty of the law. In the first definitive article of the Perpetual Peace, Kant stipulates the necessity of a republican constitution for the state ("*The Civil Constitution of Every State Should Be Republican*"). The republican constitution which guarantees democracy in every state, hence securing peace, is supported by a number of principles: "first, principles of the freedom of the members of a society (as men); secondly, by principles of dependence of all upon a single common legislation (as subjects); and, thirdly, by the law of their equality (as citizens)"[viii].

This is what concerns the state itself. As for its relations to other states, these are defined in the second definitive article, "*The Law of Nations*

Shall be Founded on a Federation of Free States"[ix]. Democracy is a prerequisite condition for achieving perpetual peace since the people who governs itself is more reluctant to pay the costs of war or to face another democratic people. It is better aware of the war's squandering of lives and resources. It incurs debts which can in their turn lead to another war, and it stunts the development of the human nature from the state of nature to the state of the civil society[x].

Kenneth Waltz endeavored to prove that although Kant called for perpetual peace, he did not consider this project practically feasible[xi]. What Waltz claims definitely contradicts the evidently clear text of Kant's project for Perpetual Peace.

English philosopher, economist, and theoretical jurist, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) is considered one of the most important advocates of this universal tendency as is clear in his book *Principles of International Law* whose part IV is entitled: "A Plan for Universal and Perpetual Peace".

Another modern manifestation of this universal tendency on the philosophical level is "universalism"[xii] which attempts to establish a "universal, almost cosmic, vision that is antagonistic to exclusion and dogmatism. It stays open and performs self-criticism with the objective of creating a universal consciousness to eliminate man's alienation in this universe."[xiii]

Unfortunately, this universal tendency was exploited by the major colonial powers in Europe in the beginning of the 19th century. Thus, it has become burdened with negative, even objectionable, undertones. It was used as a pretext to justify the world colonial exploitation and as an excuse for the hegemony of Western culture over other cultures. It was used to consolidate euro centrism and marginalization of other cultures, abolishing national sovereignty and

weakening national independence movements for the benefit of Western domination. As a result of the atrocities of World War II, there arose a view demanding the existence of a world organization, which gave rise to the League of Nations. However, this organization remained fettered by allegiance to the big powers.

In an attempt to create a universal government with better effectiveness, the United Nations was established in 1945 in the aftermath of WWII to avoid the failure of the League of Nations in preventing the eruption of a global war. The new organization was granted a wider range of powers than that of the League of Nations. However, these powers did not see the light of day except in a few cases when the five big nations agreed on something. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, hopes for a reemergence of a UN effective role were rekindled to be soon put out by the hegemony of one national state: the USA. Thus, since 1990 the effective role of the UN has disappeared, except in the cases allowed by the USA. With launch of the second Gulf War, George Bush, senior, raised the slogan of "New World Order" to justify the new imperialist policies.

Although the UN Charter has helped in principle in the domain of human rights, the adoption of double standards is still there and application is filtered by the interests of the big powers. Thus, the UN is unable to guarantee the respect of human rights in many areas of the world. The UN does not enjoy complete impartiality, firm power and disinterested, above nationality judgment that can empower it to solve hot conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Indian-Pakistani contention over Kashmir and the China-Taiwan dispute.

At the end of the 20th century, the term globalization spread widely to

justify opening world markets to Western products and to shatter customs barriers of the weak economies which would thus be dumped with imported goods. The result was destroying their economic capabilities and competitiveness before Western, or even Japanese and Chinese, companies. National industries and resources were hit and unemployment thrived. Dumping was not merely economic; it has had cultural and value aspects as well.

Concomitant with that was an attempt by the powerful national states in the West to impose their laws by forcing the weak states to sign legal treaties that serve the Western interests-an attempt to globalize Western laws through pressuring governments to change their laws through partnership or loan agreements!

One basic snag that stands in the way of the universal tendency is the strong feelings towards the national state. It is no coincidence that the rise of modern colonialism accompanied the emergence of the idea of the national state and its crystallization in the modern age. Naturally, there had been precursors of the national feeling in the middle ages, "but this feeling seemed to be a reaction to an external threat which was more self-conscious and stable."[xiv] At the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century, the concept of the national state was crystallized as the legal expression of the nation, once through asserting the right to self-determinism and the free general will of the people, and once through the idea of the shared original language, history and race. Then national ideas spread in the 19th century in Europe and took immense proportion, reaching dimensions of deification with Hegel. This led, in the 20th century, to the emergence of racial

movements, giving rise to the Nazi and Fascist governments in Germany and Italy following the First World War. After WWII, the national state gained more strength and played a greater role in the UN as the right to self-determination is linked to the national state. The UN stands helpless before the power of the national state, whether because of the domination of the large national states that can veto its resolutions facing the smaller national states, or because of the principle of "non-interference in the internal affairs of the national states". That is unless the USA wishes to activate "the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" in order to achieve its own interests, or wishes to discourage it if its interests are related to some ruling regimes that flout these rights!

The national state in the West has succeeded in bringing down the feudal systems and the absolute monarchies in Europe, but on the other hand it has kindled the chauvinistic colonial tendencies. The irony is that the same idea of the national state became a drive, in the Third World, to fight colonialism and Western hegemony. This is because the concept of the national state is basically linked to the principle of "national self-determination" which is one of the principles of the United Nations.

On the other hand, the concept of self-determination as it stands today represents an obstacle in the way of finding an effective form of a just universal tendency because of the dominance of chauvinistic, conservative and fundamentalist governments. That is also because of the unipolar power system that is dominating the world today. To redress the balance, there has to be a way to activate "the universal civil society" which is the best solution to find a universal movement that can make the

different peoples come closer, shrink the economic gap between the North and the South, activate the application of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and contribute to realizing world peace based on international justice, development for all, not based on brute force and selfishness.

FIRST: AL-FARABI AND THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF THE UNIVERSAL STATE:

I. THE UNIVERSAL STATE AMONG THE FORMS OF HUMAN COMMUNITIES:

After this historical analysis of the evolution of the ideas of the universal state and the national state, it becomes necessary to introduce the two models that are the content of this paper. To start Abu- Nasr Muhammad ibn Muhammad Farabi, a.k.a., Al-Farabi (870-950 AD) is a major representative of the idea of

universalism in the Islamic culture. He considered his utopia, *al-Madina al-Fadila* (the Virtuous City, or the universal state), the highest level of any human community. He made the political structure of the state analogous to the metaphysical structure of existence as a whole in a manner that made his political philosophy seem of a universal holistic tendency. God is at the head of existence and so is the ruler at the head of the political system as a ruler of the utopia. Thus, there is complete harmony between his political views and his metaphysics and moral philosophy. Although the apparent form of the structure of his doctrine shows the deduction of the political structure from the metaphysical structure as the metaphysical precedes the political in his book *Views of the Inhabitants of the Virtuous City*, it can be said that his deduction of the structure of existence moved

from above down, i.e., from God to beings and from the ruler to the subjects. This is the same, in one way or another in Hegel in his own philosophical manner. The difference is that Hegel made the deduction for the sake of the national state while Al-Farabi did that for the virtuous (model) universal city.

Many researchers claimed that Al-Farabi took a great deal of his political philosophy from Plato and Aristotle. They focused on the points of similarity and ignored the differences even the essential ones. Such researchers include Boutros Ghali, Abdel Rahman Badawi, Simon Blackburn among others. For example, Blackburn argues, "The Virtuous City is a version of Plato's Republic"[xv]. Ian Richard Netton, however, says, "al-Madina al-Fadila (*The Virtuous City*) is far from being a copy or a clone of Plato's Republic."[xvi] The present researcher differs with Blackburn's view as

there are aspects of essential difference between Al-Farabi and Plato, on the one hand, and between Al-Farabi and Aristotle on the other. The two Greek philosophers did not know the idea of the universal state as their model was the city-state. The Al-Farabi city "expands and extends until it becomes a universal state and a large community in which alone happiness can exist. It is therefore unjust to consider Al-Farabi's city a version of Plato's republic."[xvii] Unlike Plato and other Greeks, "Al-Farabi did not confine his thought to organizing a contracted city such as Athens or Sparta; he rather extended his thought to include a unity of all nations under one king. He is thus more comprehensive than the Greek thinkers whose political thought did not go beyond the horizon of the Greek life."[xviii]

Al-Farabi moves from the individual to the society on a civil bridge of social necessity as he sees that people naturally tend towards

forming a community since they need one another and the single individual cannot produce all he needs. The individual "needs a crowd whose every single member does something that others need, and receives what he needs similarly. Man cannot achieve perfection-for which his nature is created-without the assembly of a big cooperative group whose every member satisfies the needs of other members…"[xix] For this, human communities emerge. The city where the community is based on cooperation, adhering to laws and doing what realizes real happiness is a virtuous/utopian city. The virtuous/utopian nation is made up of virtuous cities whose inhabitants cooperate, and the cities themselves cooperate with one another. This nation, moreover, cooperates with all nations. The utopian/virtuous world exists as utopian nations, cooperating to create real happiness, emerge. Real happiness here is not realizing the welfare state in the Western style, but it is happiness arising from abiding by moral laws, i.e., eschatological happiness. Thus, Al-Farabi's book contains "a description of the ideal civic society in which all the virtues flourish."[xx] As for the false happiness, rejected by Al-Farabi, it is the mundane happiness found in fortunes, pleasure, dignity or glory.

The community can take complete or incomplete forms. The complete forms are three:

1- The universal state: this is the community of the whole inhabited world. The highest form of political community is the universal state which Al-Farabi describes as "the virtuous inhabited world which exists when nations cooperate to reach happiness."[xxi] He further says, "The community can be a clan, a town, a territory or a great nation. It can also be several nations."[xxii]

This is the greatest form of community, which clearly means that universality is the best form of human congregation in a community and that the tendency to include the whole of humanity is prevalent in his thought.

2- The sate-nation: this is assembly in a nation which is a part of the inhabited world. The sate-nation is the middle stage of the human community for Al-Farabi while it is the highest degree of the human community for Hegel.

3- The city: this is assembly in a city as a part of a nation. It is the lowest level of the complete forms of community for Al-Farabi while it was the highest ideal form for Plato, Aristotle and most Greek thinkers except the Stoics.

The incomplete forms are four: the village, the neighborhood, the street and the house.

Al-Farabi's view of the forms of political community is extensive and gradual. He sometimes moves from the lowest to the highest form, and sometimes descends, according to the hierarchical ontological schema, from the highest, "the universal state", to the lowest, "the city" when the complete forms are considered, sliding from the village to the household in the case of the incomplete forms.

The idea formulated by Al-Farabi about human community combines metaphysical and civil grounding. His thought has clear hierarchical ontological vision. The social necessity here is a civil bridge present in his philosophical induction about the human society which grows gradually from the less complete to the more complete until it reaches a unified humanity in the virtuous/utopian inhabited world which is parallel to metaphysical existence. It may be clear that such vision is consistent with the Quranic vision of a universal God of one mankind. However, Abdel Rahman Badawi, following the footsteps of

the orientalists who claimed Islamic philosophy borrowed from the Greeks, thought Al-Farabi was influenced by the Stoics[xxiii].

Al-Farabi's belief in the universal state is consistent with the nature of the Islamic creed in its concept of God. The concept of a universal God goes in harmony with the concept of a unified humanity which logically requires a universal state on the political level. Jameel Saliba asserts this saying, "He may have adopted this view simply because of his religious belief."[xxiv] This is clear by comparison to the Jewish vision of God as a private god of a private nation, which contradicts the idea of universality.

Although Al-Farabi considered the universal state the best and most complete form of human community, his unit of analysis was the city. It would have been better for him to consider the universal state since it was his

model state. He could have at least considered the unit of the nation since for him it was better than the state-city and as the living model in which he lived as a Muslim under the Islamic Caliphate.

It seems that a social functional analysis prevailed in his discussion of this point. Therefore, he started with the smaller units which compose the larger units, and moved up to the most complete unit which is the universal state. The universal state is made up of nations, and every nation of cities. The good of the larger is not possible without the good of the smaller composing units. Thus, the universal state will not attain the level of a utopia unless it is composed of a set of utopian nations which in turn are made up of utopian cities. The city is the smallest unit that can achieve "the greatest good and the utmost perfection."[xxv] Al-Farabi has an

organic interpretation for his virtuous/utopian city. It is like a living body that is complete and sound with organs that work in unison to sustain animal life and help it survive. And as the body has various organs differential in ability and nature with one principal organ, the heart, … so is the city. It has parts of different natures and various forms. It has man who is the principal organ. It also has other organs that are close to the principal one. In every section with various parts, there is a principal one performing the function of the head. These principal parts occupy the highest rank with subordinates under them playing their roles which are defined by the principal organs. The subordinates serve and are not served. They occupy the lowest ranks.[xxvi]

This may explain why Al-Farabi considered the city the primary unit of his analysis. However, there is a logical problem in Al-Farabi's belief that the virtuous nation is made up of the sum of virtuous cities and that the virtuous inhabited world is made up of the sum of virtuous nations. He thought that virtues can add up! This is considered a fallacy by logicians. He made a false synthesis; "that is a fallacy of quantity where it is asserted that what is true of the part taken singly is true of the whole. For instance, it is illogical to say "five" is both an even and odd number since it is made up of "two" (even) plus "three" (odd).[xxvii] Virtues are abstract and cannot add up. Cities may be virtuous while a nation made up of these cities may be vicious since the sum of virtuous persons does not necessarily create a virtuous group. The nation can be composed of virtuous cities while the system that governs the nation or its internal relations may be unjust. The virtuous individual is not necessarily a politically active citizen. There is a difference between the individual

and the citizen, and the state is made up of citizens not individuals. Thus, all the individuals can be of strong moral rectitude while they are not citizens with active political participation. How can they, then, form a virtuous city? All could be moral while living under a defective political system, which precludes a moral city even if the head of the system abides by morality. A person may believe in justice wishing to apply it, but this is not enough to realize it; there has to exist a political system with practical mechanisms to ensure realizing this objective in the real world. Al-Farabi did not have a say here, believing that the mere presence of the virtuous ruler is sufficient guarantee for the rise of a virtuous city composed of the sum of virtuous individuals! It is true, virtuous individuals can be an essential, but not a sufficient, condition here. They have to rise to the level of active citizens as well.

Additionally, there must be positive and fair political systems.

2. DYSTOPIAS OR NON-VIRTUOUS CITIES:

The best form of human communities is the virtuous inhabited world that is only realized when its component nations cooperate to reach real happiness. One of the most important functions of politics is to determine the identity of true happiness in order to distinguish between real and false happiness. Al-Farabi opines, "Civil knowledge searches primarily for happiness"[xxviii].

If the virtuous inhabited world, nation or city seeks true happiness, which is eschatological happiness, all non-virtuous cities seek false worldly happiness in such things as "fortunes, pleasure, dignity or glory and man valorizes other things as well that the public call good things."[xxix] All these concern "ignorant government, ignorant politics and ignorant profession…"[xxx]

Al-Farabi's division of cities as virtuous and otherwise is based on the distinction between two kinds of government: virtuous and ignorant. He says, "Government falls into two categories. The first is governments that empower acts, movements and faculties of the will to achieve what is truly happiness - this is virtuous government. Nations and cities that live under such form of government are the virtuous nations and cities. The second category is the government which promotes acts and features that achieve what is thought to be happiness while it is not so in fact. This is the ignorant government."[xxxi] This last category varies in purpose; "if its purpose is accumulating riches it is called mean government; if its purpose is glory it is called a glory government; if it is for another purpose it carries the name of that purpose."[xxxii] In *al-Madina al-Fadila*, Al-Farabi **sums up the non-virtuous cities in four categories which are:**

1- Ignorant city: this is of various types which are: the essential city that secures satisfaction of the necessary needs; the barter city that accumulates wealth and deals with money and trade; the mean city that seeks pleasures and sensual delights of gluttony and sex; city of pride which caters for glories and pomp to attract praise and extolment; the city of conquest where people cooperate to make their city conquer others; and finally the collective city where people are equal and free, doing as they please - a form of democracy that we may call a chaotic democracy since it is based on people's whims. In such city, the post of the governor can be bought by money, which is the same form mentioned by Plato. It is clear that neither Plato nor Al-Farabi knew any other form of democracy such as

consociational democracy, liberal democracy and social democracy. Hegel as well was in some sense against democracy just like Al-Farabi.

2- Impious city: this adopts the views of the virtuous city but does the acts of the ignorant city.

3- Transformed city: this transforms from a virtuous to a non-virtuous city.

4- Lost city: this has lost its way to happiness, so it adopts the wrong views on God, being and the other world. It behaves in a manner that does not make it reach complete happiness since it follows a ruler who deceives people by saying he is divinely inspired, depending on false pride, deception and disguise.[xxxiii]

3. THE HIERARCHICAL VIEW OF BEING AND THE UNIVERSAL VIRTUOUS CITY:

Is politics a reflection of metaphysics for Al-Farabi? Or is it that metaphysics is a reflection of politics? Which is the source, and which is the reflection? Does Al-Farabi relate political legitimacy in his utopia to the people or to a metaphysical will? Is his political structure based on public will and political freedom, which leads to equality and justice, or is it grounded in metaphysical legitimacy and political coercion, which leads to discrimination and bias for the sake of one class at the expense of another?

Al-Farabi's texts apparently show that the hierarchical view of the political social system is similar and subsequent to the metaphysical structure. He says, "There is a positive correlation between the parts of the world and the parts of the virtuous city or nation. Within the parts of the virtuous nation harmony, there also has to be coherence, system and coordinated acts similar to that of the natural bodies which must be reflected in the parts of

the virtuous nation in its bodies and powers of will"[xxxiv].

Thus, politics is a reflection of metaphysics as the apparent wording of this text, and other Al-Farabi texts, suggest. However, ideological analysis may reveal a different view seeing metaphysics as a reflection of politics. Scholars differ in determining the precedence; which comes first and which is the reflection of the other? The majority see metaphysics as the source and politics as a mere reflection. They follow Al-Farabi himself in the manner of presenting and structuring his political philosophy in his book, *al-Madina al-Fadila*, where he starts with metaphysics then moves on to politics. One such scholar is Majid Fakhry who argues that Al-Farabi sees politics and morals as "an extension or development of the metaphysical subject matter or of its most sublime aspect, i.e., theology"[xxxv].

A minority of relevant scholars, including Muhammad Aabid Al Jabri in his book, *We and Tradition*, argue that metaphysics is a reflection of politics. He says politics comes first; it is the mover; then metaphysics comes as a reflection of politics or as its theoretical grounding on the ontological or doctrinal level. Al Jabri says, "It is the project of social organization in the *Virtuous City* that suggested the metaphysical hierarchical structure."[xxxvi] Al Jabri does not explain the reasons for upholding this view believing it sufficient to say, "This is a familiar phenomenon of ideological reversal"[xxxvii]. In a later book, *Arab Ethical Mind*, he contradicts himself saying, "The Greeks built their divine city on the model of their worldly social city… but Al-Farabi did the opposite; he built his city on the model of his divine city-the cosmological city"[xxxviii].

Apart from Al-Jabri's contradictions, there is some conviction of the political nature of Al-Farabi's metaphysics. That is because of the basic components of the political structure itself and its consequent results. Examining the political structure of Al-Farabi's state with the purpose of finding its component elements and its consequent results, we find a solution for this problem—a solution that reveals the ideological nature of Al-Farabi's metaphysics. He built this metaphysics on the model of the political systems of his time; then once again reversed the order. Consequently, he attributed the political structure of his city to metaphysics in an effort to find the lost political legitimacy! In Al-Farabi's Utopia, *al-Madina al-Fadila*, "the status of the king or the highest ruler, is the same as that of God who is the First organizer of all beings, the universe and all it contains"![xxxix] It is an ideological game that sums up the positions which legitimacy took in the ancient and medieval politics.

If we reveal the threads of the trap of this ideological game that moves legitimacy away from the popular will into the realm of metaphysics primarily created by political design, alternating positions of politics and metaphysics, we see clearly the despotic nature of the political metaphysical structure. The concept of popular will is absent from Al-Farabi's thought; political freedom is nothing but chaos for him as is apparent in his analysis of what he called the "collective city" where people are equal and free doing as they please. Al-Farabi's political structure of the state is based on a hierarchical one concentrating all power in the hands of the ruler who is above all in the city just like God, the Ruler of all being. The dictatorial structure in its most flagrant form is

obvious here even with all the ideal features Al-Farabi ascribes to the ruler. History has disproved the idea of the "just despot" even if this ideal despot rules the ideal city in the head of a philosopher.

The anti-democratic hierarchical vision is usually the suitable model of a despotic system which rules from above. This vision sees no difference between the configuration of existence and that of the political system, especially for those who adhere to a comprehensive hierarchical vision that includes heaven and earth. Examples are the emanation thinkers, especially the Neo-Platonists who believe in the One from whom everything in the world emanates and the emanation theory of some Islamic thinkers including Ismaili Shiites and Al-Farabi. Thus, "one source of despotism and coercion is the hierarchical vision of the world. First, there is the One, from whom emanates the plurality of things: the intellect and the psyche and

finally matter as is well-known in emanationism with its sources in Greek philosophy and its variations in Christianity and Islam. Emanation starts from the Perfect Absolute Being then with gradual degradation it pours into lesser beings with movement from the highest degrees of perfection down to the lowest degree of deficiency. Therefore, the world degrades down from absolute perfection to absolute deficiency. There is no difference here between a vision of the universe and a visualization of the society, between status of heavenly orbits and the ranks of social classes"[xl].

The metaphysical hierarchical visualization creates a despotic system in most cases, but this does not mean that despotism and dictatorial regimes are all based on a metaphysical hierarchy. The truth of a thesis does not mean the necessary untruth of its opposite. Some communist and secular states today

are despotic although they preclude any metaphysical hierarchy. At the same time, there are no metaphysical hierarchies that set forth a democratic system except in exceptional cases that do not negate or weaken the general rule.

The core of Al-Farabi's metaphysical visualization is a hierarchy, in all its model states, that is suitable to a despotic regime which rules from above; all beings emanate from the First. The first intellect emanates from God as a necessary emanation. From this first intellect emanates another intellect and a higher sphere; then emanation flows on in this manner, from intellect to intellect and sphere, covering ten intellects and ending with the effective intellect. "The next flows from the previous through the thinking of the First on all levels. Each intellect in itself produces a sphere in the following order: the first sky, the constant

planets, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Mercury, then finally the moon. With the moon's sphere, thinking intellects that are in essence both perceiving intellects and perceived entities, the heavenly bodies come to an end. The basis of the order is that the one emanates only one"[xli].

This is the metaphysical world above the lunar sphere which Al-Farabi inferred using descending dialectic. He means by that to narrow the gap between God and the world as well as between God and man. As for the physical world, that is, under the sphere of the moon, Al-Farabi uses the ascending dialectic; the order goes from down upwards. The lowest of the existents is primary common matter. This is followed in order by the four elements[xlii], minerals, plants, lower animals, and finally human animals that have no better."[xliii] However, some individuals among men are

better than others and humans fall into classes with a ruler above them all. Al-Farabi uses the ascending dialectic to "maintain moving forward through raising man to the divine realm, thus making it possible to realize God's kingdom on earth-the land of man and human community"xliv.

Apart from the descending or ascending dialectic of the inferring process, the structure of the organization of the world in Al-Farabi's thought is hierarchical moving from up down in the sphere of existence. Thus, the lower it goes, the more numerous and less perfect the existents. This goes on to the last of existents that do the acts of service and fall in the lowest ranks. They cannot do acts of leading in the first place. The first and oldest of existents that cannot be preceded by any other cannot do acts of service in the first place. All the existents in the middle ranks that come after the

first head do acts of leading which serve the first head. They work in unison displaying close affinity amongst themselves, regularity, and solidarity so much that they look like one unit despite their plurality. Their unity arises from the effect of the served one and his penetrating influence, worthy status and the required delegation of acts through which the existent leads or serves or both."xlv

This hierarchy is also found in what Al-Farabi calls the human powers of the psyche as it is found in the ranks of the organ of the human body.

This ontological hierarchy is reflected in the hierarchy of the *Virtuous City* where "the status of the king and first ruler is the same status of God who is the first power that runs existents, the world and all it contains." The ranks then go down gradually until they end with the lowest

rank, which is that of "the classes whose acts can only serve and never lead…"[xlvi]

Al-Farabi seems, as this ontological vision of being reveals, to harbor a visualization of a universal state. The first ruler is the representative of God as his counterpart in the human world. The ruler governs a group of nations through divine revelation. Here lies one of the essential differences between Plato and Al-Farabi as the latter sees divine revelation descending to the first ruler "one rank after another, so the first ruler runs the city, the nation and the nations as delegated by God's revelation. The revelatory empowerment moves through the ranks to every section of the city till it reaches the very last of them"[xlvii]. This means that the first ruler is a universal prophet. "He runs the virtuous city in a different manner from running the universe, but there is a correlation between the two"[xlviii].

Compared to Al-Farabi's idea that the first ruler is the representative of God and his counterpart in the human world, Hegel sees the hero, such as Alexander, Julius Caesar and Napoleon, as a mediator for realizing history[xlix]. He is a mediator of the Spirit of the world, the Absolute Spirit. For Al-Farabi, it is God- and the prophet philosopher; for Hegel, it is the Absolute Spirit- and the political military hero.

The first ruler has an essential role in uniting humanity in a universal virtuous city based on a metaphysical justification which Al-Farabi presents. He says,

The Mover of the universe created its parts as natural bodies that work together in regularity, organization and solidarity of act. Despite the plurality of these bodies and acts, they behave as if they were

one body doing one act for one purpose. In a similar manner, the conductor of the nation has to infuse in the parts of the city and nation faculties of will that drive them to have the same regularity, organization and solidarity of acts. This will enable the nation and nations, despite the plurality of their parts and ranks and acts, to be like one body that does one act to realize one purpose[1].

Therefore, the highest ruler of the universal state has to follow the steps of the Mover of the universe. So, "he [too] should compose in the cities and nations their corresponding crafts, bodies and faculties of will, each according to its rank and worthiness, with the purpose of making communities of the cities and nations reach happiness in this life and afterlife[li]". It is clear that Al-Farabi is dealing here with the universal state as the ruler should run "communities of the cities and nations" following the divine method in running the universe so they can reach the good things obtained with their will to realize true happiness.

This task requires that the first ruler be a philosopher beside his status as a prophet. He "cannot realize anything in the world designed by God's will unless through this"[lii]. That is through theoretical philosophy. This universal virtuous city is not possible in Al-Farabi's view unless there is "in the city a common group with unanimous views, creeds and acts, following regularity, organization and solidarity of acts so that they can work in unison in order to realize the sought after objective which is extreme happiness"[liii].

The hierarchical system which runs from up down suggests a "personalized" system that identifies the character of the ruler with that of the system, making the ruler the

holder of absolute power over his subordinates. This is not asserted simply through equating God with the ruler; it is further emphasized through a wider range of correspondences between the structure of transcended minds and the world of man as soul and body, on the one hand, and civil community on the other hand"[liv]. In this lies the "personalization" of the system and its absolutism where "power is concentrated in the person of a monarch"[lv].

However, can Al-Farabi's stance be justified by his desire to achieve unity, which cannot be realized without control over all powers in a society on the verge of disintegration? This was the case when the authority of the Abbasid Caliph was eroded, ceding power to local sultans amidst numerous political disturbances and wars. In the case of Hegel, was the unity of Germany the reason why he glorified

the monarchy? The question remains valid: is the price of unity the rule of an individual whose person identifies with the system, totally for Al-Farabi and relatively for Hegel?

Nevertheless, there is a favorable thing in Al-Farabi's utopia, which is its universality. This is not evidenced only in what he says about the "virtuous inhabited world", "nations", "God who runs the virtuous city as he runs the world, and "communities of nations and cities". His words about the parallelism between the earthly virtuous city and the heavenly city obviously indicate that in this context he does not refer to the city in its narrow Aristotelian Platonic sense. His city is the inhabited world city or the universal city since the parallelism of earth and heaven means the whole planet earth as it means the entire heaven; the latter is not composed of feuding cities;

it is one city, the "City of God" embracing "harmonious cities".

Additionally, Al-Farabi also creates parallelism between his virtuous city and the earthly virtuous city in the physical world, which is a clear indication that he steers away from the narrow Aristotelian Platonic sense towards the inhabited world city. The parallelism with the physical world includes the entire physical world since in the physical world there are "natural bodies that work together in regularity, organization and solidarity of act. Despite the plurality of these bodies and acts, they behave as if they were one body doing one act for one purpose". So should be the human community on earth which can be composed, if we wish, of the best form of human community: one city, the "Virtuous Inhabited World City". This contains all less perfect forms, the nation community as a middle degree of human community and the community of a city as a part of a nation and the lowest and smallest form of the complete community.

4. HEAD OF THE VIRTUOUS CITY AND PERSONALIZATION OF POWER:

In his political philosophy, Al-Farabi detailed the views, creeds and thoughts which prevail in the city and spelled out the characteristics of the head as the key and pillar of the political system. He mixed his person with that of the state-a habit that is still there in the Third World and the totalitarian regimes in general. If the citizen is, at least theoretically, the cornerstone of the democratic states, the head of the state is the cornerstone of Al-Farabi's virtuous city. The state in the democratic systems stands on institutions, or thus it should be, but the virtuous city of Al-Farabi is the city of a virtuous head of state who is the distinguishing factor between a virtuous state and a vicious state. The virtuous state head "seeks what

achieves for him and all his subordinates extreme happiness which is the true happiness. This makes this congregation virtuous"[lvi]. On the other hand, the ignorant head of state seeks what achieves good things for him through them. These could be perceived in ignorance-such as the necessary good things of health, safety, wealth, glory, or conquest. He alone, excluding them, gains and enjoys these things, making his subordinates mere tools to achieve and maintain his purpose. The best of rulers in this state of ignorance are those who seek to achieve good things for their subjects not themselves or for both the ruler and the ruled. The head of state here is in a state of ignorance thinking himself wise and virtuous, seconded in this wrong belief by his subordinate. He seeks extreme happiness which is not the true happiness. Alternatively, his leadership may be under the disguise of apparent good which

deceives his subordinates who believe him wise and virtuous, but still his aim is an illusion of happiness realizing in reality some good things of the state of ignorance[lvii].

The characteristics of the state head are summed up in twelve of them: "bodily health, sharp perception, memory retention, intelligence, fluency of expression, love of learning, absence of gluttony, truthfulness, dignity, no interest in money and worldly possessions, justice, intrepid determination"[lviii]. These are almost the same characteristics determined by Plato for the head of state in his *Politics* dialogue, and the same qualities enjoyed by the Prophet of Islam Muhammad. As De Boer says, "Farabi endows his 'Prince' with all the virtues of humanity and philosophy; he is Plato in the mantle of Prophet Muhammad."[lix] This is not adequate since it makes Plato

more original than Muhammad, which contradicts the real fact as these qualities were realized both in thought and in action through the Prophet while Plato's project floundered in real life. It is more accurate to say that Al-Farabi's qualities of the head of a state expressed the person of Muhammad dressed in Plato's philosophical garb and detailed in Al-Farabi's book. The content of Al-Farabi's book was realized in reality in the person of Prophet Muhammad while it was only represented as theory in Plato's philosophy. Therefore, the more likely influence on Al-Farabi is the character of the Prophet who believes and to whom the Islamic civilization is ascribed. The influence of Plato here does not go beyond the philosophical language that Al-Farabi used for the expression of his thought.

Whatever the case is, these qualities apply to Al-Farabi's first ruler, the head of state, the founder of the virtuous city, the philosopher-prophet. If this philosopher-prophet is succeeded by another who is like him in everything, "the successor will be able to do what his predecessor could not do. Moreover, he can also change much of what the first legislated if the relevant point has a different context with new requirements. This does not mean that the first committed a mistake, but only saw what is good for his own time. When a third successor comes to power, he will be like the second in all cases and so on with the fourth. The successor can evaluate the new situation and opine differently from the predecessor as this predecessor would have done if he stayed in power."[lx]

If after the philosopher-prophet there followed no successor who is like him in everything, second heads of state take his place. Al-Farabi here deals with this issue in

the context of the Islamic caliphate, which creates another major point of difference with Plato, especially when Al-Farabi sees that the second head of state, i.e., the successor (the Caliph) "has to emulate in his judgment his predecessor without modifying or altering a thing. He has to leave all things the way they are resorting to evaluation of new variables when there is no precedence, thus infers and deduces from what the first did."[lxi] Therefore, he has to be a scholar of jurisprudence so he can know the old laws and legal provisions and understand the terminology of the language of the first head of state. Moreover, he has to have sharp perception of the originally desired meanings, knowledge of the familiar judgments and competence in giving guidance referring to the laws of the predecessors and their followers. He has to be competent in deducing judgments from the

ways of the predecessors so he can proceed following their footsteps. Inferences from the old incidents should suit the new facts. He should be a philosopher well versed in theoretical matters[lxii], and acts of war and military industries[lxiii]. "If there is no one person who has all these qualities while there are two people: one is wise and the other has the rest of the qualities, they should become the two heads of this city. If the qualities are scattered over a group of people, wisdom residing in one and the rest of the qualities in the others who can work together, they become the virtuous heads[lxiv]. Al-Farabi opens the door for the presence of two heads of state or a presidential council in the case of absence of a suitable person with all the required qualities.

While Al-Farabi, dealing with the virtuous city, nation or inhabited world, focused his attention on the qualities of the head of state and on

thoughts, creeds and views that prevail in the city, he steered away from the rules and institutions of his state system. Dr. Boutros Ghali sees that Al-Farabi "took great interest in the qualities of the high Prince of the universal government more than he showed any interest in systems and laws while the European thinkers concentrated all their efforts on coordinating systems and laws without heeding the qualities which should be enjoyed by the persons who supervise these governments"[lxv].

This is not completely true. While it is true that Al-Farabi focused his attention on the qualities of the head of the state, the European thinkers did not concentrate all their efforts on coordinating systems and laws without heeding the qualities which should be enjoyed by the persons who supervise these governments. Plato heeded the qualities of the ruler calling for a wise philosopher as a

ruler. Moreover, Machiavelli detailed the required qualities in his book *The Prince*. Hegel, in his turn, devoted long sections of his writings to deal with the power of the Crown, taking pains to infer the right form of power which he saw should be hereditary. It is true that Hegel did not detail the qualities of the king in the manner of Plato and Al-Farabi or even Machiavelli, but he focused on his power, considering that the existence of the king is a *fait accompli* which he accepted. The role of the philosopher here is to support the authority of the king! Hence, it would not be correct to generalize saying that the European thinkers confined their efforts to coordinating systems and laws without heeding the qualities which should be enjoyed by the persons who supervise these governments.

On the other hand, Al-Farabi considered religion the constitution and the governing law. "Religion is

views and acts inferred according to conditions set by the first head of state for posterity with the purpose of achieving his objective for them in a definite manner"[lxvi]. Religion is like the constitution and the law, and the first head of state has the power of legislation as he should have "the ability to make good inference of the conditions of actions, movement and faculties in each community, city or nation in the short run or the long run or according to the relevant time and place if possible. These are the abilities that make up the first virtuous ruling faculty"[lxvii]. Referring to religion, Al-Farabi uses here the term *millah*, an equivalent of the term religious denomination. However, he uses *millah, sharia*, and *deen*, (denomination, religious law, and religion) almost interchangeably. For him, the expression *millah fadilah* (virtuous religion) is equal to philosophy. As philosophy can be theoretical or practical so is

"denomination" or "religion". Practical religion is in its general forms like practical philosophy. Virtuous religious laws go under the general aspects of practical philosophy. The theoretical views of religion find proofs in theoretical philosophy, and thus they are adopted in religion without question. Philosophy gives proofs to religion, and the ruling faculty which arises from virtuous religion goes under philosophy.[lxviii]

The rulers abide by the laws of religion, but when new events require inferring new laws, the rulers have to infer rules and turn them into laws which religion has not explained. However, they cannot change the first laws. Al-Jabri missed the point when he opined otherwise[lxix]. The right to change the first laws is the privilege of the first head of state or the successor who is like him in everything- a status granted to

prophets not successors. Al-Farabi clearly states, "If he is succeeded after his death by that who is like him in everything, the successor will be able to do what his predecessor could not do. Moreover, he can also change a lot of what the first legislated …"[lxx] Al-Farabi's words are clear and candid; he means prophets not mere successors. The expression who is like him in everything is only applicable to prophets as the successors can only emulate in a general manner and have no right to change; their rights being confined to inferring new rules from precedents[lxxi].

SECOND: HEGEL AND THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF THE NATIONAL STATE:

I. HEGEL'S REJECTION OF THE UNIVERSAL TENDENCY:

While Al-Farabi considered the virtuous universal state the perfect form of community, George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) rejected the universal tendency as it is against the concrete life of the state. He gives philosophical proofs that the national state is the highest form of the political development of the Absolute Spirit. Calling for reinforcing the hegemony of the national state over its citizens, he is truly the philosopher of the Prussian State. Since Hegel, there has been a prevailing belief that the national state is the end of history as the most sublime expression of its reaching its final purpose where consciousness identifies with itself. The idea of the national state has thrived as a political idea since the 19th century. It gained interest as a pivotal idea with a sacred status in Europe then many parts of the world because of the great aspirations and illusions that surrounded the acts and capabilities of this state. Many nations found in it

the ideal means of liberation from all sorts of historical despotism and a means to drive communities to the highest summit of sovereignty, development and freedom.

However, it is interesting that Karl Marx based his theory of human liberation on the hypothesis of the inevitable disappearance of this kind of state, replacing the management of people (politics) by the management of things, i.e., a new society which runs and organizes its own affairs. This will be an end in itself in the Stalinist regimes and will represent a framework for organizing the new bureaucratic class and its major controlling tool, which will turn politics into a means to manage people as things in an unprecedented manner never encountered before in history[lxxii].

It is ironical that Hegel while advocating universality of law based on the unity of and universality of the human value, he rejects the universal tendency. This shows how

Hegel would refuse what is called now globalization since *globalization* as a contemporary term, or its classical form *cosmopolitanism*, is against the "concrete life of the state". Rejecting this tendency in the context of explaining the unity of human value of all people, Hegel says, "This consciousness, which is the aim of thought, is of infinite importance, and it is inadequate only if it adopts a fixed position - for example, as cosmopolitanism - in opposition to the concrete life of the state"[lxxiii]. Hegel "elevated the national interests of the particular state to the place of highest and most indubitable authority in international relations. The state puts forward and asserts the interests of its members by welding them into a community… Undisputed *internal* authority of the state is a prerequisite for successful competition."[lxxiv] In any case, Hegel's rejection of cosmopolitanism is meant to serve the national state as the highest

stage of the development of the political Spirit and the end of history!

2. DIALECTICAL VIEW OF EXISTENCE AND THE DEDUCTION OF THE NATIONAL STATE:

Hegel expounds the philosophy of Spirit, *Geist*, which goes through stages of development as he says the state is the "Spirit which gives itself its actuality in the process of world history"[lxxv]. Nevertheless, Hegel considers Absolute Spirit (art, religion, philosophy) higher than Objective Spirit (law, morals, sociology and politics). Knowing the position of the Objective Spirit in the context of Hegel's doctrine explains how Hegel put philosophical truth higher than political truth. His thought is built on the idea of the Absolute Geist or Absolute Idea[lxxvi]. This develops according to a dialectic rhythm of three moments: thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. The first revelation of the Absolute Idea happens in logic which is the idea in itself before it externalizes. The idea is then revealed in nature as the idea externalized. Here, the Absolute Idea is transformed into concrete nature, and the idea becomes antithesis. It is now concrete nature and nature is against the logical idea, hence the idea becomes alienated. The Idea is then revealed in Spirit as the Idea in itself and for itself. This is the stage when Spirit comes back to itself where Spirit combines nature and logical idea. This is because mind is idea as concrete being, it is a state of nature. Spirit is a synthesis of thesis and antithesis, i.e., of logical idea and nature.

Spirit in itself and for itself goes through three stages: subjective spirit, objective spirit and absolute spirit. Subjective spirit is individual human consciousness which includes psyche, sensual consciousness, comprehension, instinctual desire, reason, intuition, imagination, memory, practical reason, drives, will etc. Objective spirit is the spirit which externalizes itself outside of

its subjective circle and appears in the world of law, morals, sociology and politics, and becomes embodied in systems, institutions and organizations. Hegel dealt with this objective spirit in *Philosophy of Right*; it includes abstract right (property, contract, wrong), morality (purpose and responsibility, intention and welfare, good and conscience) and social ethics, *Sittlichkeit*, (family, civil society, the state)[lxxvii]. As regards Absolute Spirit, it knows itself in actual reality as free absolute spirit that can perceive absolute truth. It moves gradually towards comprehending the absolute in art, religion and philosophy[lxxviii]. Thus, Hegel has effected a "definite subordination of the objective to the absolute mind and of the political to the philosophical truth".[lxxix]

3. THE NATIONAL STATE AGAINST THE PEOPLE:

It is clear that the national state dominates the will of the people whom Hegel despises considering the civil society unable to manage the conflict of needs and selfish interests of the particular feuding individuals. Hegel looks upon the people as "the category who do not know their own will"[lxxx]. His disdain is extreme when he defines the people as "the many". He says, *The many* as single individuals - and this is a favourite interpretation of [the term] 'the people' - do indeed live together, but only as a crowd, i.e. a formless mass whose movement and activity can consequently only be elemental, irrational, barbarous, and terrifying.[lxxxi]

That is if they are not under state control. Moreover, Hegel may have been thinking of the *Volksbewegung* [popular movement] of his time. The Prussian monarchy may well have seemed a paragon of reason compared to that Teutonic movement from 'below.' Yet, Hegel's advocacy of a strong hand over the

masses is part of a more general trend, which threatens the whole constitutional structure of his state.[lxxxii]

The idea of the modern national state arose as a result of the disintegration of feudal property, deterioration of crafts, emergence of capitalist economy, decline of the aristocracy, breakdown of the old political ties and the emergence of the civil society with its legal and economic ties. However, Hegel thinks the civil society is always unstable[lxxxiii], which requires a higher entity to restore to it its stability. This higher entity is the state which coordinates and synthesizes the conflicting elements of the civil society. It goes beyond, *aufheben*[lxxxiv] [annulling and keeping at the same time], the civil society, but this going beyond does not mean that it abolishes it completely. It combines both abolishing and keeping. It is abolishing as it abolishes the contradiction of the elements, and it is keeping as it keeps these elements themselves within a synthesis. On this "Hegelian tendency to raise the state to the level of dissolving and preserving the society, the national movements and philosophies are fed to raise the state above the society, giving the civil society a negative quality for the sake of a growing deification of the concept of the state"[lxxxv], and the national state in particular.

The civil society is the stage which the state has to go beyond as "the State is the self-conscious ethical substance, the unification of the family principle with that of civil society"[lxxxvi]. The state cannot exist without a mediator which is the law (for Al-Farabi, it is religion). The reason why the state evolves is that "civil society cannot be an end in itself because it cannot, by virtue of its intrinsic

contradictions, achieve true unity and freedom. The independence of civil society is therefore repudiated by Hegel and made subordinate to the autonomous state"[lxxxvii]. The contradiction in the civil society is what Hegel uses as a justification of the absolute authoritarian tendency of the national state. Thus, he finds validation for raising the state above the civil society, giving it absolute power over individuals and civil society! The function of the state is to direct the individuals, unify the parts in a "whole", achieve balance between private and public interests, and organize and control the civil society, especially as it is not a conflicting opponent of the state, being only a stage on the way to establish the state.

Hegel's analysis of civil society shows that he has the national state as a frame of reference as he means to prove that civil society will always involve contradictions unless the state intervenes to solve these contradictions. This makes it clear that the key to understanding Hegel's political philosophy is his theory about the state, and the national state in particular. This is, for example, different from that of the Italian anti-fascist thinker Antonio Gramsci (1891 – 1937) who has civil society as the springing point and keynote of his political philosophy. Hegel, on the other hand, considers the state the "true base" for family and civil society although the state evolves from them. Thus, "the state in general is in fact the primary factor; only within the state does the family first develop into civil society, and it is the idea of the state itself which divides into these two moments"[lxxxviii]. Though Hegel himself dealt with the state after civil society in order, he still considered the state per se the logical basis. The state for him is

the end, and at the same time it is the basis and the beginning.

In paragraphs 257, 258 and 259 of *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, Hegel presents the basis for glorifying the national state. For him, it is infinitely rational, an end in itself and for itself, and the identity of the moral spirit. In it, self-consciousness finds its essential freedom when it has been raised to consciousness of its totality. In it, as well, "freedom enters into its highest right, just as this ultimate end possesses the highest right in relation to individuals"[lxxxix]. That is because the state is the social excellent actualization of the Absolute Idea; it is "the actualized Mind, and as the actualized Mind, it is positive freedom which cannot be surpassed by any concrete freedom; the alternative of the state is nothing but opinion, individual desire, and pettiness of consciousness… The individual Will has no importance

whatsoever"[xc]. The individuals are nothing but mere moments.

Hegel asserts that the national state is, in itself, a lesson which sets up our constitutional thinking. The constitution is the collective spirit of the nation, and the state is "the perfect embodiment of Spirit"[xci]. This is the Spirit which gives itself actuality in the process of history[xcii]. Therefore, Hegel considers the state "more important than any person"[xciii]; it has the upper hand over everyone: individuals, civil society and the Church. It is necessarily an "organism" which extracts from its own unity the internal differences to give them life, making them independent entities while still keeping them inside its unity.[xciv] It should be mentioned that considering the state an organism has its equivalent in Al-Farabi's thought as he likened his virtuous city to the whole body. This has its traces too in Aristotle.

For Hegel, the idea of the state evolves over three moments. The first moment is represented in the constitutional law which organizes the state and determines its political existence based on power divided into three components: legislative power, executive power and the power of the king. The second moment is the international law which governs the relations among independent states. The third power is the history of the world as the true actualization of the idea of the state which reaches its ideal form in the Germanic world!

In each of the previously mentioned moments, Hegel incessantly emphasizes the authority of the state at the expense of the civil society in general and the individual in particular. This goes in direct opposition to the liberal view which puts the individual in the center of the political structure, and allows the civil society to enjoy a considerable amount of freedom as, for example,

in the views of John Locke, Thomas Paine and Adam Fergusson. It is also against the stance of the Gramsci's revolutionary philosophy that criticizes the state's coercion, repressive systems, and legislative bodies which justify and legalize the control of the ruling class. Gramsci also criticizes the regime intellectuals who propagate the ruling class view of the world, and generally calls for a stand against the state hegemony.

Hegel's glorification of the state reveals his totalitarian tendency. This view was seconded by Jacques Maritain (1882-1975) as the state is the final actualization of the Absolute Spirit. It determines the existence and identity of the individual as the individual has no value unless he is a member of the state[xcv]. However, totalitarianism here is different from that of the old empires since his state does not depend on enslaving people as these empires did in the old days. It

controls them in a better way as the state itself represents the identity and reality of the individuals' will[xcvi]. Moreover, Plamenatz sees that Hegel's political philosophy includes a sort of bias towards the state at the expense of the people; therefore, "Hegel, in different senses, was against democracy and liberalism"[xcvii].

4. AUTHORITY OF THE KING IN THE NATIONAL STATE:

Hegel considers the constitutional monarchy the highest stage in the development of the national state. He views the monarchy as the perfect system. The other systems, such as the republican, are considered by Hegel deficient giving justification based on the analogy between the state and a living organism- an analogy used by Al-Farabi as well. The living organism must have a center that runs its activities and coordinates its functions. Hence, the state must have one person who

directs its activities and coordinates its functions- this is the monarch[xcviii]. He further says,

Seen in abstraction, this ultimate self of the will of the state is simple and therefore an immediate individuality [Einzelheit], so that the determination of naturalness is inherent in its very concept. The monarch, therefore, is essentially determined as this individual …[xcix]

The king's post is hereditary; 'this individual is destined [bestimmt] in an immediate and natural way, i.e. by his natural birth, to hold the dignity of the monarch'[c]. Once again, the context imposes recalling Al-Farabi to determine points of similarity and difference between the two thinkers. Al-Farabi argues that the head of the virtuous city "cannot be any person at random; leadership is based on two things; one of them is ingrained nature; the other is form and will"[ci]; i.e., he must have both natural talent and the will to rule. This does not

necessarily mean hereditary rule for Al-Farabi as it is for Hegel. It rather means simply the natural talent to be a leader. Although Al-Farabi mentioned the profession of the king, he did not call for hereditary monarchy. Neither did he say the monarchy is the only virtuous system as he was only interested in virtuous politics. He, therefore, says,

This profession is that of the king, the monarchical profession, or whatever man would like to call other than the king. Politics is the practice of that profession, that is, to do the acts that can empower and preserve the works and faculties in the city or nation. This profession does its function well if it knows all the acts which can empower and preserve after that. Leadership is that which empowers, in the city [or] nation, the works and faculties that aim at realizing extreme happiness and preserve it for them; this is the virtuous leadership[cii].

Hegel sees the power of the sovereign as the perfect power as it contains within it all "the three moments of the totality within itself, namely the universality of the constitution and laws, consultation as the reference of the particular to the universal, and the moment of ultimate decision …"[ciii]. The ultimate decision is for the king but he is not arbitrary, and the Hegelian philosophy allows saying that the monarch rules according to his divine right. That is to say that the monarchy is a rational system, and the top and bottom of the national state are rational as much as they divine. However, he denies that the king's authority is absolute or arbitrary because rationality requires the constitutional monarchy[civ].

Although these are not absolute powers as seen through the theoretical analysis, such a system will automatically turn, in reality, into an authoritarian system. This is

as far as the king is "this ultimate self of the will of the state"[cv], and as far as he does not come to power through free elections, especially when Hegel refuses the principle of separation of powers, saying that it will lead to the destruction of the state.

THIRD: OUTCOME OF THE COMPARISON BETWEEN AL-FARABI AND HEGEL:

The previous analysis presented two cases of political philosophy in two different cultures. In the first case, philosophical deduction reveals that the universal state is the perfect form of human community, based on the unity of the human race-a unity that brings together virtuous nations. In the second, philosophical deduction discloses that the national state is **the highest stage of the development of the Absolute Spirit** and the end of history. It is the finest expression of the Absolute Spirit reaching its ultimate end and self-consciousness realizing itself. It further reveals that the **universal state** is against the "concrete life of the state"!

The contrast between Al-Farabi and Hegel does not arise merely from the difference between a philosopher who advocates a universal state and another who endorses the national state. It, moreover, springs from the difference in their cultural and historical backgrounds. The "Arabs started to write about social phenomena and system of government in the historical stages when the Arab society started to decline, retreat or disintegrate, i.e., in the Islamic Middle Ages (starting the 4th century of Hegira). Opposite to this, the European thinkers wrote about these issues before or with the historical rise of society and state in modern Europe, i.e., starting with the 15th century A.D."[cvi]

Paradoxically, the disparity between the two backgrounds and

between two states, universal and national, does not preclude similarities that impose themselves without any claims of influence. The similarities do not imply any identical ideas; they simply refer to ideas that converge in certain areas and quickly diverge in others. Two similar ideas start as identical then one of them becomes different from the other or goes beyond it. Al-Farabi's nation-state is revealed to be the middle stage of human community. This is the stage which Hegel considered the highest and most perfect human community. Then, Al-Farabi goes beyond it to a farther stage.

There is complete harmony between Al-Farabi's political vision and his metaphysics, theology and ethics. His deduction concerning existence is political and his deduction of the political form is metaphysical. The same applies to Hegel, but the latter used his deduction to serve the national state while Al-Farabi's deduction was for the benefit of "Virtuous City-Inhabited World".

The national state was the identity of the Moral Spirit for Hegel. In contrast, Al-Farabi made morality the identity of his city. Hegel believes in the correspondence between the state and an organism just like Al-Farabi. The organism necessarily needs a center to direct its activities and coordinates its functions. Hence, there has to be someone in the state to direct its activities and coordinates its functions, and this is the monarch. Al-Farabi's corresponding idea is the analogy with the sound human body— the analogy was used as well by Aristotle. The state in Hegel's vision cannot exist without a mediator which is the law. Similarly, Al-Farabi's state cannot exist without the means of "denomination" (religion), putting in consideration the undeniable difference between law and religion.

Hegel asserts the state is a lesson in itself as it sets up our constitutional thinking, the constitution being the collective spirit of the nation, and the state the perfect embodiment of this spirit. Al-Farabi, on the other hand, asserts religion as the governing constitution. Al-Farabi's denomination is almost perfectly synonymous with religion, and the virtuous denomination is, for him, almost synonymous with philosophy. For him "denomination" replaces the law and the constitution. However, Al-Farabi knows no representative assemblies as is the case in the constitutional monarchies. Hegel's national state is absolutely rational. Al-Farabi's universal state is based on a rational philosophy as he says, "It is philosophy that provides proofs of the virtuous denomination. Therefore, the kingly profession which protects the virtuous denomination is categorized under the term philosophy." To be more specific, it is the theoretical philosophy within the boundary of reason.

Hegel argues that the alternative of the state is nothing but opinion, individual desire, and pettiness of consciousness. The individual Will has no importance whatsoever. The individuals are but mere moments. This means that Hegel is against democracy and liberalism. This is the same for Al-Farabi who rejects democracy by rejecting the collective city where people are free and equal, doing as they please.

The state for Hegel is the complete embodiment of Spirit. This is the Spirit which gives itself actuality in the process of history. For Al-Farabi, the state (city-nation-inhabited world) is an embodiment of the heavenly city. Hegel sees the authority of the king as the ultimate controlling power as it contains within itself all the three moments of the totality. The ultimate decision is that of the king. The Hegelian

doctrine allows the divine right of the king, meaning that the monarchy is a rational system and the top and bottom of the national state are rational as they are divine. Al-Farabi, on the other hand, sees the ruler as the embodiment of God who is the first mover of all existents and the world with all its components. The ruler governs a group of nations while resorting to divine revelation. If the first head of state is the representative of God and analogous to him in Al-Farabi's view, Hegel makes the hero-king (such as Alexander, Julius Caesar and Napoleon) the representative of Absolute Spirit and the mediator to realize history-the mediator of the Spirit of the world[cvii]. However, Hegel's king enjoys the hereditary right of succession to the throne while Al-Farabi does not mention the hereditary right and does not consider the monarchy the only virtuous system. He just cared for the virtuous head of state and virtuous politics.

The potency of the system in Al-Farabi's view is based on the personality of the ruler, hence the personalization of the system. This was motivated by a desire to achieve unity that cannot be realized without control of all powers in a society threatened by disintegration. Hegel devoted long pages to explain the authority of the monarch, attempting hard to deduce the elements of this power which he sees has to be hereditary. It is true that Hegel did not detail the characteristics of the king as Plato and Al-Farabi did. He rather focused on his authority as the existence of a king in the system in Germany at that time was taken for granted by Hegel, seeing that the role of the philosopher is to support the monarch! This is explained perhaps by the desire to preserve the unity of Germany or by

mundane interests of the philosopher!

CONCLUSION:

FROM DIFFERENCES CONCERNING THE STATE AND METAPHYSICS TO UNIVERSAL CIVIL SOCIETY:

The idea of one state for one universal society is thus disclosed to be an idea with a precursor in Islamic philosophy, especially with Al-Farabi in the fourth Hegira century (10th Century AD). Although his idea of the virtuous inhabited world is based on moral grounds, he fell in the trap of personalization of the state. However, in all cases, the idea of establishing a universal state would be a great idea if it were based on justice and good morals.

It also transpired that visions of the state adopted by both Al-Farabi and Hegel involved contradictions caused by ideologies that consecrate absolutist rule. Such ideologies drove some thinkers into inconsistencies and sometimes contradictions which they could have avoided if they followed their rational thought to its logical end and freed themselves from domination of their contemporary ruling regimes. Ideology is the divulging keyword that explains how two different political ideas, the universal state and the national state, arise from almost the same metaphysical grounds. Both Al-Farabi and Hegel based their political notions on divine premises. The former made the virtuous city analogous to the heavenly divine realm, i.e., the ruler analogous to God; the latter considered the monarch a representative of the Absolute Spirit! Nevertheless there is a basic difference between them. Hegel's state represents a closed system which has reached its end as he considered the Prussian state the ultimate end of history, and Christianity the end of religious history. This applies as well to his

philosophy as the ultimate expression of the development of the Absolute Spirit. The word "end" here bears the meaning of completion and culmination not the passive sense of termination. Al-Farabi's idea, despite its falling under the influence of his time, came in the framework of an outlook of the future when the virtuous universal state can be accomplished[cviii].

If the belief in the unity of the human race is what drove Al-Farabi to argue that the universal state is the perfect form of human community, the absolutist ideology is what made him advocate personalization of the system and identifying the governor with government. This ideology also drove Hegel to personalize the system while still advocating the state built on institutions. This is related to the spirit of the time, which proves true Hegel's dictum that philosophy mirrors its time of course as related to the contexts of Al-

Farabi and Hegel. This dictum does not ring true in other contexts when philosophy goes beyond its time as in the case of Kant and his greatest of the political, philosophical projects with a universal tendency: the Perpetual Peace Project.

Another paradox remains: Why did the idea of the national state feed the world colonial movement and at the same time serve as an agent of instigating liberation from colonialism around the world? This paradox is resolved through history and ideology. When the national state idea evolved it joined forces with ideas of asserting the public free will of the people and the right to self-determination. Then at other times it joined forces with ideas of original language and common history or race, thus leading to the idea of national sovereignty and to the ambition of liberation, independence or unity. However, ideologies played their role pushing

the idea of national state further in a chauvinistic manner. This led to extremist and antagonistic tendencies against other nations, hence the spirit of colonialism / imperialism. However, although Hegel advocated the idea of the national state and deifying the state, he asserted that states have their individuality and independence in their relations to one another. He was motivated here by his desire to preserve the unity of Germany, not for the sake of colonialism. He considers it "delusional for a state to try to merge another into itself whether through invasion or cordial understanding since this merger will make the two states lose their souls and their real essential beings. Thus, throughout history, all attempts to merge one state into another failed miserably even after a long period of time. This explains the decline of all empires"[cix].

Hegel believes that the failure of internal solutions to abolish the contradiction of civil society makes it seek solutions outside itself. Here, civil society thinks the solution lies in colonialism since "This inner dialectic of society drives it - or in the first instance this specific society - to go beyond its own confines and look for consumers, and hence the means it requires for subsistence, in other nations which lack those means of which it has a surplus or which generally lag behind it in creativity, etc."[cx]. Therefore, opening new markets to solve the contradiction of the society which has come to suffer both poverty and abundance of products is what drives it to colonize other countries. This is the typical colonial expansionism of the civil society. The colonial expansionism of the state is a different pattern which is done with complete awareness and organized planning. Hegel explains that the drive behind this pattern is overpopulation combined with no desire to engage in productive work.

It is clear that Hegel rejects the idea of colonialism as a solution to the contradiction of civil society since this is nothing but an external solution that exports contradiction to another society. This is also clear in Karl Marx's work where he explains colonialism as a solution of the contradictions of the capitalist society. Hence, he asserts that colonialism fails as it transfers contradiction instead of solving it. Marx devoted the last chapter of volume one of his *Das Kapital* to the phenomenon of colonialism[cxi]. Thus, Hegel's advocacy of the national state did not incline him towards colonialism. However, the idea of the national state took extreme dimensions with others and turned into a colonial tendency, culminating in Nazism.

Now, why did the idea of a universal state fail to actualize until now while the idea of a national state thrived?

THE CAUSES ARE NUMEROUS:

First, there is the cultural cause where cultural differences and clashes of civilizations exist among the nations of the world. The differences become even more set apart with the growing trends which emphasize cultural specificities and Western adamant desire to impose hegemony over the human culture moving it towards Western centrism and control. This creates a reaction in the form of nationalist reclusive movements and reasserting national and cultural specificity and introvert cultural stagnation. It breeds political and religious fundamental movements. However, this cultural diversity does not support Rousseau's view of the absence of any unity in the human race. Cultural diversity which verges on incongruity has its justifying causes. Moreover, it is not an inevitable fate. Its sharp edges can be smoothened by tolerance which can

turn it into creative cultural diversity, enriching humanity instead of consecrating its misery. That is if the kindling factors of these causes disappear. The idea of universality is not necessarily antagonistic to cultural diversity since plurality does not have to promote conflict since the one can come out of the many, or as the Roman poet Virgil's poem says, "doth he go at last and Into a coherent ball doth bring the different portions, that it may the Name and likeness of a finished salad fit."[cxii].

The question remains: how can the diverse factors be blended together without letting one factor dominate the others? Is blending necessary for universality? Or is it possible for universality to coexist with creative cultural diversity? Human universality does not necessarily negate the national state; it merely lessens its absolutist control over its citizens, limits its

cultural introversion, and alleviates the exploitation practiced by local capitalists. The survival of the national state and culture may seem necessary at this stage of human development without chauvinism or authoritarianism that curbs individual freedom, hinders democracy and arbitrarily controls people's means of living. Rational universality is the system than can solve the hard equation of the universality of humanity versus the national state, and universal culture versus cultural identity. It can be done through dialogue of civilizations and their integration within a framework of diversity according to just, rational criteria that believe in the unity of the human race.

Second, imperialist ploys keep building up in the big powers to get on the wagon of universalism, or globalism with the purpose of turning it into an ideology full of their exploitative inclinations. The

imperialist powers which have benefitted from the universal/global trend are the Western powers which were antagonistic towards the former Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist states. On the other hand, Marxism had called for proletarian internationalism, which was another form that exploited the Universalist trend for the benefit of Marxist ideology!

Third, there are the passive effects of Western capitalism which has turned the world into markets, depleting resources for its own good. This has created South-North conflict widening the gap between the Third World and the developed world.

Fourth, there is a long history of antagonism among the different nations resulting from a heritage of historical wars, e.g., Persian-Greek wars, Persian-Roman wars, the Crusades invading the Islamic Word, the Turkish wars against Europe, the two world wars, etc.

Fifth, world institutions do not enjoy trust because they have fallen under the influence of the big powers. They are not ready to display commitment to their international obligations when these go against their material interests. They sometimes even adopt double standards which they impose on the United Nations. This miserable situation was exacerbated when the world turned unipolar with the small national states losing trust in the international organizations which consider themselves the ultimate reference of world order, playing lackey to the big powers. The UN cannot do a thing in this situation, which undermines the bridges of trust and runs against finding a formula for international joint work.

Sixth, dictatorial regimes which set up cultural and political barriers to isolate them from the rest of the world thrive in many countries.

Through this, they try hard to hoist up their authority and control, which support the national state against any universal formula that can undermine their authority. Without a world made up of democratic systems, no world peace is possible, no form of international cooperation can be drafted, and the international institutions will remain an arena of conflict as Kant said in his Perpetual Peace project.

Most of these causes fall in the lap of the ruling regimes around the world. Therefore, a question poses itself: **Is there a way out of the historical dialectic of national versus universal state by resorting to a third party other than the ruling regimes around the world?**

The solution is activating the role of "the world civil society" which has greater freedom to avoid the domination and hegemony of some national states thanks to information and communication technology and to its freedom from the political calculations that limit the capabilities of those in power in the national states. Moreover, in most cases, there is no mistrust in its intentions as its structure is more democratic than that of governments. The world civil society has better chances for reinforcing the civil ties among the peoples of the world. The meeting of members of the same profession around the world is much easier than the meeting of politicians. Charity societies can expand the scope of their influence outside their state through meeting with similar societies around the world. Additionally, human rights organizations have a greater opportunity for joint efforts uninfluenced by the double standards of politicians. Environmentalist societies can exert pressure on governments or large corporations to realize their cause. Pro-peace NGO's can practice all sorts of transnational civil efforts supporting a culture of non-conflict and peace, etc.

This may create the necessary infrastructure which can, if expanded, form international non-governmental organizations enjoying more justice and more power to spread just peace and world economic balance. In this framework, cooperation of the different parts of the international civil community may increase and become more organized, turning eventually into a "united nations of the civil society organizations" which represents peoples not governments, and seeks to realize what the UN, made up of national governments, has failed to accomplish.

TRANS. BY ALI AL-GAFARI

NOTES:

[i] See: "Epistle to Galatians", *The Bible* 3:28; and *the Quran* 5:32 & 49:13.

[ii] Louis L. Orlin, "Hellenistic Age", in: *Academic American Encyclopedia,* New Jersey, Arete, 1980, Vol. X, p. 114.

[iii] Abdel Rahman Badawi, *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Beirut, Arab Establishment Pub., 1984, 113.

[iv] Plutarch, *On the Fortune of Alexander*, Vol. IV of the Loeb *Classical Library edition*, 1936 p. 399.

[v] Abdel Salam Abdel Aali, Al-Farabi's Political Philosophy, Beirut, Taliaa Pub., 3rd ed., 1986, p.145.

[vi] See:

- DeMolen, Richard, ed., *Erasmus* (1974).

- Huizinga, Johan, *Erasmus of Rotterdam* (1962).

- Nash, Paul, Models of Man: Explorations in the Western Educational Tradition (1966).

- Smith, Preserved, *Erasmus: A Study of His Life* (1923; repr. 1960).

- Woodward, William, Desiderius Erasmus Concerning the Aim and Method of Education (1954)

vii Erika Rummel, "Erasmus" in: *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, London, Routledge, 2000, p. 252.

viii Kant, Perpetual Peace, in: *Kant, On History*, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1963, p. 20. p. 94.

ix Kant, Perpetual Peace , p. 98.

x Kant, An Idea for a Universal History" in: *Kant, On History*, Indianapolis, Bobbs- Merril ,1963, p. 20.

xi For more details see: Kenneth Walt, "Kant, Liberalism, and War", *American Political Science Review*, 56, June 1962. p. 331-340.

xii Murad Wahba prefers to use the Arabic equivalent of the term "cosmopolitanism" in his *Philosophical Dictionary*, Cairo, Qiba Pub., 1998, p. 562.

xiii Murad Wahba, *Alienation and Universal Consciousness*, Kuwait, Alam Al-Fikr, 1976.

xiv Abdel Wahhab Al-Kayyali et al., *Encyclopedia of Politics*, Beirut, Arab Establishment of Studies and Publishing, 1987, p. 829.

xv Simon Blackburn, *the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, 1996. p.11

xvi Ian Richard Netton, "AL-Farabi" in: *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London*, Routledge, 2000, p.273

xvii Muhammad Abdel Rahman Marhaba, *From the Greek to the Islamic Philosophy*, Beirut, Ewidat Publications, 3rd ed., 1983, p. 468.

xviii Jameel Saliba, *From Plato to Avicenna*, Beirut, Al-Andalus Pub., 4th ed., p.65.

xix Al-Farabi, *al-Madina al-Fadila* (The Virtuous City), ed. Albert Nassri Nader, Beirut, 1973, p. 117.

xx Blackburn, *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, p.11.

xxi Al-Farabi, *al-Madina al-Fadila*, p.118.

xxii Al-Farabi, *Kitab al-Millah* (The Denomination), ed. Muhsin Mahdi, Beirut, Mashriq Pub., 1986, p. 43.

xxiii Abdel Rahman Badawi, *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Vol.2, p. 113.

xxiv Jameel Saliba, *From Plato to Avicenna*, p. 65.

xxv Al-Farabi, *al-Madina al-Fadila*, p.118.

xxvi Ibid.

xxvii Murad Wahba, *Philosophical Dictionary*, Egypt, Qiba Pub., 1998, p. 655. Imam Abdel Fattah, *Ethics and Politics*, Cairo, Supreme Council for Culture, 2001, p. 211.

xxviii Al-Farabi, *Kitab al-Millah*, p. 52.

xxix Ibid.

xxx Ibid., p. 54-56.

xxxi Ibid., p. 71.

xxxii Ibid.

xxxiii Al-Farabi, *al-Madina al-Fadila*, p.132-133. For more details, see also: Al-Farabi, *al-Sayassa al-Madaniyya (Civil Politics)*, ed., Fawzi Metri, Beirut, 1964, p.118 ff; and Al-Farabi, *Kitab al-Millah*, p. 54-56.

xxxiv Al-Farabi, *Kitab al-Millah*, p. 65.

xxxv Mjid Fakhry, A *History of Islamic Philosophy*, trans. Kamal al-Yazjy, Beirut, p. 167.

xxxvi Muhammad Aabid Al-Jabri, *We and Tradition*, Beirut, Arab Cultural Center, 5th ed., 1986, p.81.

xxxvii Ibid.

xxxviii Al-Jabri, *Arab Ethical Mind*, Beirut, Arab Unity Studies Center, 1sr ed., 2001, p. 357.

xxxix Al-Farabi, *Kitab al-Millah*, p. 63-64.

xl Hassan Hanfi, "Roots of Despotism", *Emirates Itahad Newspaper*.

xli Abdel Rahman Badawi, *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Vol.2, p. 105.

xlii Fire, air, water and earth.

xliii Al-Farabi, *al-Madina al-Fadila*, p.66.

xliv Al-Jabri, *We and Tradition*, p. 74.

xlv Al-Farabi, *Kitab al-Millah*, p. 63. Compare also: Al-Farabi, *al-Madina al-Fadila*, p. 57.

xlvi Ibid. p. 63-64.

xlvii Ibid. p. 64.

xlviii Ibid. p. 65.

xlix Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, trans. Imam Abdel Fattah Imam, Cairo, Culture Pub., 1986, p. 100-101.

l Al-Farabi, *Kitab al-Millah*, p. 65.

li Ibid. p. 66.

lii Ibid.

liii Ibid.

liv Al-Jabri, *We and Tradition*, p. 73.

lv Gordon Marshall, "Absolutism," *Dictionary of Sociology*, Oxford University Press 2000, 2003.

lvi Al-Farabi, *Kitab al-Millah*, p. 44.

lvii Ibid. p. 43-44.

lviii Al-Farabi, *al-Madina al-Fadila*, p.127-129.

lix T. J. De Boer, *The History of Philosophy in Islam*, London, Luzac & Co., 1903, p. 123.

lx Al-Farabi, *Kitab al-Millah*, p. 49-50.

lxi Ibid. p. 5.

[lxii] Ibid. p. 51-52.

[lxiii] Al-Farabi, *al-Madina al-Fadila*, p.129-130.

[lxiv] Ibid. p. 130.

[lxv] Boutros Ghali, *The Universal Government*, Cairo, Maarif Pub., 1992, p. 45.

[lxvi] Al-Farabi, *Kitab al-Millah*, p. 43.

[lxvii] Ibid. p. 60.

[lxviii] Ibid. p. 46-47.

[lxix] Al-Jabri, *We and Tradition*, p. 76.

[lxx] Al-Farabi, *Kitab al-Millah*, p. 49.

[lxxi] Ibid. p. 50.

[lxxii] Borhan Ghalioun, "Evolution of the concept of civil society and its development from abstract concept to social and international matrix," a lecture given in the Society & Democracy Seminar, Qatar Univ., P.14-17 May, 2001.

[lxxiii] G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991, p. 240.

[lxxiv] Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 2nd ed., 1955, p. 221.

[lxxv] Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, p.281.

[lxxvi] That is why his philosophy is described as absolute idealism. See: D. W. Hamlyn, *Metaphysics*, Cambridge University Press, 1984. p. 24.

[lxxvii] Michael Inwood, *A Hegel Dictionary*, Blackwell Publishing, 1992, p. 92-94.

[lxxviii] Yehya Hweidi, *Story of the Western Philosophy*, Cairo, Thaqafa Pub., 1993, p. 99.

[lxxix] Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, p. 178.

[lxxx] Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, p. 340.

[lxxxi] Ibid. p.344.

[lxxxii] Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, p. 219-220.

[lxxxiii] David E. Cooper, *World Philosophies, A Historical Introduction*, Wiley-Blackwell, 2nd ed., 2002, p. 319

[lxxxiv] Imam Abdel Fattah, *Hegel's Dialectics*, Beirut, Tanweer Pub., 1986, 3rd ed., p. 390.

[lxxxv] Borhan Ghalioun, "Evolution of the concept of civil society".

[lxxxvi] Hegel, *The Philosophy of Mind*, trans. W. Wallace, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971, Paragraph 535.

[lxxxvii] Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, p. 202.

[lxxxviii] Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, p. 274.

[lxxxix] Ibid., p. 275.

[xc] Eric Weil, *Hegel et l'État*, trans. Nakhlah Freefer, Beirut, Tanweer Pub., 1986, p. 53.

[xci] Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree, New York, Dover Publications, 1956. p.17.

[xcii] Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, p. 282.

[xciii] Ali Abdel Moeti Muhammad, *Contemporary Philosophical Trends*, Alexandria, Marefa Gameya Pub., 1984, p. 37.

[xciv] Walter Stace, *The Philosophy of Hegel*, trans. Imam Abdel Fattah Imam, Cairo, Thaqafa Pub., 1980, p.585.

[xcv] Jacques Maritain, *Moral Philosophy*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964, p.163-4.

[xcvi] Ibid., p. 164-5.

[xcvii] J. P. Plamenatz, "Man and Society: political and social theories from Machiavelli to Marx": *Hegel, Marx and Engels, and the ideal of progress*, Vol. 3, London, Longman, 1992, p.264. It is worth of mention that the titles of the other two parts are:

- Man and Society: political and social theories from Machiavelli

to Marx: From the Middle Ages to Locke, Vol. 1.

- Man and Society: political and social theories from Machiavelli to Marx: From Montesquieu to the early socialists, Vol. 2

[xcviii] Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, p. 308-317.

[xcix] Ibid., p. 321.

[c] Ibid.

[ci] Al-Farabi, *al-Madina al-Fadila*, p.122.

[cii] Al-Farabi, *Kitab al-Millah*, p. 54.

[ciii] Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, p. 313.

[civ] Ibid., Comments by Knox p. 151 and 281. And Walter Stace, *The Philosophy of Hegel*, p. 590-593.

[cv] Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, p. 321.

[cvi] Saad Eddeen Ibrahim et alia, Society and the Sate in the Arab World, Beirut, Arab Unity Study Center, 2nd ed., 1996, p. 77-78.

[cvii] Hegel, Lecture on the Philosophy of History, Vol. 1, p. 100-101.

[cviii] Although Al-Farabi was said to belong to the Ismaili Shiites, he did not explicitly express belief in the idea of the Mahdi [a messianic leader who (according to popular Muslim belief) will appear before the end of the world and restore justice and religion].

[cix] Abdel Rahman Badawi, *Hegel's Philosophy of Right and Politics*, p. 213.

[cx] Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, p. 267-268.

[cxi] Jean-Pierre Lefebvre et Pierre Macherey, *Hegel et la Société*, trans. Mansour Al-Qadi, Beirut, 1993, p. 51.

[cxii] O. B. Hardison, Jr., *Entering the Maze: Identity and Change in Modern Culture*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1981, p. 4-5.

* * * *