Cairo University Faculty of Commerce Accounting department



Using the Developed Balanced Scorecard to Design Managers' Compensation: An Empirical Study

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Master in Accounting

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بِسْم اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيم

وَقُلِ اعْمَلُوا فَسَيَرَى اللهُ عَمَلَكُمْ وَرَسُولُهُ وَالمُؤْمِنُونِ وَسَتُرَدُّونَ إِلَى ۖعَالِمَ الْغَيْبَ َوَالَشَّهَادَةِ فَيُنَبَّكُمْ بِمَا كُنْتُمْ تَغْمَلُونَ (105)

سورة التوبة

Abstract

This research aims at modifying the managers' compensation by using the developed balanced scorecard (BSC) in profitable organizations within the Egyptian environment, where the profitable organizations have a great effect on the net income of any country.

Due to the importance of BSC, as a tool of improving organizations' performance and their profits as well, where it contains number of related measures to evaluate the performance, many studies were developed to link BSC's measures with managers' compensation, and to improve compensation contract for general (GM)/ chief executive manager (CEO) of the organization.

Survey some literature, in the area of using BSC's measures to design managers' compensation, revealed that; first, some studies in the literature discussed the subjectivity-based and economic-based approaches for linking the compensation system with BSC's measures using case studies. Therefore, the results can be generalized with some restrictions. Second, linking third generation BSC (strategic alignment) with the managers' compensation system, to the best of the researcher knowledge, seems to have been overlooked. Third, there is a lack of the studies that were concerning the circumstances of each country, and the effects of these circumstances on managers' behavior, according to the best knowledge of the researcher. Finally, almost all of the surveyed literature studies can be classified as pure researches, where they integrated the BSC system into linear compensation contracting model, without any application to test its applicability in practice.

Due to the previous conclusion, three gaps were addressed. An empirical study was developed to test the effects of designing managers' compensation due to the BSC's measures (through its different generations) on managers' behavior and organization performance. This empirical study tested the business sector (private and investment) within the Egyptian environment.

To address previous gaps, four main hypotheses were developed to be tested. The required data was collected through a questionnaire. The population of the empirical study is the GM/CEO of business sector in Cairo and Giza Governorates, where these Governorates have a large amount of invested funds in Egypt. The main variables of the study are: BSC, managers' compensation, and nonfinancial/longrun performance of the organization, in addition to five control variables; managers' experience, managers' duration in managing the organization, managers' qualifications, the organization legal form, and the organizations' activities.

The study sample contains (38) managers; (34.2%) of the sample from industrial organizations and the same percentage applied for the services organizations. While (31.6%) of the sample are from commercial organizations.

The findings of the study can be summarized as follows: First, there is a strong positive relationship between using BSC, through its second and third generations, in the Egyptian environment and the current managers' compensation system. Second, there is a strong positive relationship between using BSC as a strategic alignment tool in the organizations and organizations' non-financial/long-run performance. Third, there is no significant relationship between the current managers' compensation system and nonfinancial/long-run performance of the organization. Finally, the analysis showed that there is no effect of the five control variables on the main three variables of the study except some cases.

Key wards: balanced scorecard; managers' compensation; agency theory; stock options; financial measures; non-financial measures.

Dedications

To my Mum and Dad, words will never be enough, I owe everything to you. Thank you a lot for your great support and given love during my whole life. I ask Allah to grant you health and happiness.

To my dear brothers and sister, thank you for your encouragement and support. May Allah bless you and keep you safe.

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