

Propositional logic is a weak language

- Hard to identify “individuals.” Ex. Mary, 3
- Can’t directly talk about properties of individuals or relations between individuals. Ex. “Bill is tall”
- Generalizations, patterns, regularities can’t easily be represented. Ex. all triangles have 3 sides
- **First-Order Logic** (abbreviated FOL or FOPC) is expressive enough to concisely represent this kind of situation.
 - FOL adds relations, variables, and quantifiers, e.g.,
 - “Every elephant is gray”: $\forall x (\text{elephant}(x) \rightarrow \text{gray}(x))$
 - “There is a white elephant”: $\exists x (\text{elephant}(x) \wedge \text{white}(x))$

First-order logic

- First-order logic (FOL) models the world in terms of
 - Objects, which are things with individual identities
 - Properties of objects that distinguish them from other objects
 - Relations that hold among sets of objects
 - Functions, which are a subset of relations where there is only one “value” for any given “input”

Ex: Objects: Students, lectures, companies, cars ...

- Relations: Brother-of, bigger-than, outside, part-of, has-color, occurs-after, owns, visits, precedes, ...
- Properties: blue, oval, even, large, ...
- Functions: father-of, best-friend, second-half, one-more-than ...

FOL Syntax

- **Variable symbols**
 - E.g., x, y, John
- **Connectives**: $\neg$, $\wedge$, $\vee$, $\Rightarrow$
 - **Quantifiers**
 - Universal $\forall x$
 - Existential $\exists x$

Syntax of First-order logic

Sentence $\rightarrow$ *AtomicSentence*
| (*Sentence* *Connective* *Sentence*)
| *Quantifier* *Variable*, . . . *Sentence*
| > *Sentence*

AtomicSentence $\rightarrow$ *Predicate*(*Term*, . . .)
| (*Term* = *Term*)

Term $\rightarrow$ *Function*(*Term*, . . .)
| *Constant*
| *Variable*

Connective $\rightarrow$ $\neg$, $\wedge$, $\vee$, $\Rightarrow$

Quantifier $\rightarrow$ $\forall$, $\exists$

Constant $\rightarrow$ *A*(*X* | (*John* 1 . . .

Variable $\rightarrow$ *a* | *x* | *s* | . . .

Predicate $\rightarrow$ *Before*...

Function $\rightarrow$ *Mother* | ...

Atomic Sentences

- Propositions are represented by a **predicate applied to a** tuple of terms. A predicate represents a property or relation between terms that can be true or false:
- Brother(John, Fred), Left-of(Square1, Square2), GreaterThan(plus(1,1), plus(0,1))
- Sentences in logic **state facts** that are true or false.
- In FOL properties and n-ary relations do express that:
LargerThan(2,3) is false. Brother(Mary,Pete) is false.
- Note: **Functions do not state facts** and form no sentence:
Brother(Pete) refers to the object John (his brother) and is neither true nor false.
- Brother(Pete,Brother(Pete)) is True.



Truth in first-order logic

- Sentences are true with respect to a **model** and an **interpretation**
- Model contains objects (domain elements) and relations among them
- Interpretation specifies:
constant symbols → objects
predicate symbols → relations
function symbols → functional relations
- An atomic sentence $predicate(term_1, \dots, term_n)$ is true iff the objects referred to by $term_1, \dots, term_n$ are in the relation referred to by $predicate$

Entailment

- **Entailment** means that one thing **follows from** another:


$$KB \models \alpha$$

Knowledge base **KB** entails sentence α if and only if α is true in all worlds where **KB** is true

- E.g., the KB containing “the Greens won” and “the Reds won” entails “Either the Greens or the reds won”
- E.g., $x+y = 4$ entails $4 = x+y$
- Entailment is a relationship between sentences (i.e., **syntax**) that is based on **semantics**
- **entailment**: necessary truth of one sentence given another

Models

- Logicians typically think in terms of **models**, which are formally structured worlds with respect to which truth can be evaluated
- We say **m is a model of** a sentence α if α is true in **m**
- **$M(\alpha)$** is the set of all models of α
- Then $KB \models \alpha$ iff **$M(KB) \subseteq M(\alpha)$**
 - E.g. **KB** = Greens won and Reds won
 α = Greens won
- Think of KB and α as collections of constraints and of models m as possible states. $M(KB)$ are the solutions to KB and $M(\alpha)$ the solutions to α .
Then, $KB \models \alpha$ when all solutions to KB are also solutions to α .



Nested Quantifiers

- Combinations of universal and existential quantification are possible:

$$\forall x \forall y \text{Father}(x, y) \equiv \forall y \forall x \text{Father}(x, y)$$

$$\exists x \exists y \text{Father}(x, y) \equiv \exists y \exists x \text{Father}(x, y)$$

$$\forall x \exists y \text{Father}(x, y) \neq \exists y \forall x \text{Father}(x, y)$$

$$\exists x \forall y \text{Father}(x, y) \neq \forall y \exists x \text{Father}(x, y)$$

$$x, y \in \{All\ people\}$$

A common mistake to avoid

- Typically, $\Rightarrow$ is the main connective with $\forall$
- Common mistake: using $\wedge$ as the main connective with $\forall$:
- Ex:

$$\forall x \text{At}(x, \text{CU}) \wedge \text{Smart}(x)$$

means "Everyone is at CU and everyone is smart"

Yet to say Everyone at CU is smart

$$\forall x \text{At}(x, \text{CU}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(x)$$

Another common mistake to avoid

- Typically, $\wedge$ is the main connective with $\exists$
- Common mistake: using $\Rightarrow$ as the main connective with $\exists$:

$$\exists x \neg \text{At}(x, \text{CU}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(x)$$

is true if there is anyone who is smart not at CU.

Yet to say: there exists someone in CU that is smart

$$\exists x \text{At}(x, \text{CU}) \wedge \text{Smart}(x)$$

Properties of quantifiers

$\forall x \forall y$ is the same as $\forall y \forall x$

$\exists x \exists y$ is the same as $\exists y \exists x$

$\exists x \forall y$ is **not** the same as $\forall y \exists x$

$\exists x \forall y \text{Loves}(x, y)$

– “There is a person who loves everyone in the world”

$\forall y \exists x \text{Loves}(x, y)$

– “Everyone in the world is loved by at least one person”

- **Quantifier duality**: each can be expressed using the other

Exp.

Negation

$\forall x \text{Likes}(x, \text{IceCream}) \quad \exists x \neg \text{Likes}(x, \text{IceCream})$

$\exists x \text{Likes}(x, \text{Broccoli}) \quad \forall x \neg \text{Likes}(x, \text{Broccoli})$

Equality

Equality:

$term_1 = term_2$ is true under a given interpretation if and only if $term_1$ and $term_2$ refer to the same object

FOPC can include equality as a primitive predicate or require it to be as identity relation

$Equal(x,y)$ or $x=y$

Examples:

to say "that Mary is taking two courses", you need to insure that x,y are different

$\exists x \exists y (\text{takes}(\text{Mary},x) \wedge \text{takes}(\text{Mary},y) \wedge \sim (x=y))$

To say "Everyone has exactly one father"

$\forall x \exists y \text{ father}(y,x) \wedge \forall z \text{ father}(z,x) \rightarrow y=z$

Higher Order Logic

- FOPC is called first order because it allows quantifiers to range only over objects (terms).

$\forall x, \forall y [x=y \text{ or } x>y \text{ or } y>x]$

- **Second-Order Logic** allows quantifiers to range over predicates and functions as well

$\forall f, \forall g [f=g \iff (\forall x f(x)=g(x))]$

- **Third-Order Logic** allows quantifiers to range over predicates of predicates,
- .. etc

Examples of FOPC

- Brothers are siblings

$$\forall x, \forall y \text{ *Brother*(x,y) } \Rightarrow \text{ *Sibling*(x,y)}$$

- One's mother is one's female parent

$$\forall m, \forall c \text{ *Mother*(c) = m } \Leftrightarrow (\text{ *Female*(m) } \wedge \text{ *Parent*(m,c)})$$

- “Sibling” is symmetric

$$\forall x, \forall y \text{ *Sibling*(x,y) } \Leftrightarrow \text{ *Sibling*(y,x)}$$

Translating English to FOL

- Every gardener likes the sun.

$$(\forall x) \text{ gardener}(x) \Rightarrow \text{ likes}(x, \text{Sun})$$

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- You can fool some of the people all of the time.

$(\exists x) \text{person}(x) \wedge ((\forall t) \text{time}(t)) \Rightarrow \text{can-fool}(x, t)$

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- All purple mushrooms are poisonous.
 $(\forall x) (\text{mushroom}(x) \wedge \text{purple}(x)) \Rightarrow \text{poisonous}(x)$

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- All purple mushrooms are poisonous.
 $(\forall x) (\text{mushroom}(x) \wedge \text{purple}(x)) \Rightarrow \text{poisonous}(x)$
- No purple mushroom is poisonous.
 $\sim (\exists x) \text{purple}(x) \wedge \text{mushroom}(x) \wedge \text{poisonous}(x)$
or, equivalently,
 $(\forall x) (\text{mushroom}(x) \wedge \text{purple}(x)) \Rightarrow \sim \text{poisonous}(x)$

Translating English to FOL

- There are exactly two purple mushrooms.

$$(\exists x)(\exists y) \text{ mushroom}(x) \wedge \text{purple}(x) \wedge \text{mushroom}(y) \wedge \text{purple}(y) \wedge \sim(x=y) \wedge (\forall z) (\text{mushroom}(z) \wedge \text{purple}(z)) \Rightarrow ((x=z) \vee (y=z))$$

Inference in FOL chapter 9 in Russel

- $KB \vdash_i \alpha$ = sentence α can be derived from KB by procedure i
i.e. deriving sentences from other sentences
- Soundness**: i is sound if whenever $KB \vdash_i \alpha$, it is also true that $KB \models \alpha$
i.e. derivations produce only entailed sentences (*no wrong inferences, but maybe not all inferences*)
- Completeness**: i is complete if whenever $KB \models \alpha$, it is also true that $KB \vdash_i \alpha$
i.e. derivations can produce all entailed sentences (*all inferences can be made, but maybe some wrong extra ones as well*)

Validity and satisfiability

- A sentence is **valid** if it is true in **all models**,
- e.g., *True*, $A \vee \neg A$, $A \Rightarrow A$, $(A \wedge (A \Rightarrow B)) \Rightarrow B$

Validity is connected to inference via the following:

$KB \models \alpha$ if and only if $(KB \Rightarrow \alpha)$ is valid

A sentence is **satisfiable** if it is true in **some model**

e.g., $A \vee B$, C

A sentence is **unsatisfiable** if it is true in **no models**

e.g., $A \wedge \neg A$

Satisfiability is connected to inference via the following:

$KB \models \alpha$ if and only if $(KB \wedge \neg \alpha)$ is unsatisfiable

(there is no model for which $KB = \text{true}$ and α is false)

Proof Methods in FOL

Major Families:

- GMP
- Reduction
- Resolution
- Forward chaining
- Backward chaining

Some Other inference tools:

Entailment/ Unification/

Proof Methods in FOL

- GMP: Using the generalized form of Modus Ponens
- Reduction: Reduce all FOL sentences to propositional Calculus then use inference in propositional calculus
- Resolution – Refutation
 - Negate goal
 - Convert all pieces of knowledge into clausal form (disjunction of literals)
 - See if contradiction indicated by null clause $\square$ can be derived
- Forward chaining
 - Given P, $P \rightarrow Q$, to infer Q
 - P, match *L.H.S* of
 - Assert Q from *R.H.S*
- Backward chaining
 - Q, Match *R.H.S* of $P \rightarrow Q$
 - assert P
 - Check if P exists